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Economic Perspective 1 
MAKING TRACES: CATERPILLAR'S CRAWL FROM SCOTLAND 
Dr Nigel Haworth, Department of Industrial Relations 
University of Strathclyde 
Malcolm Rifkind is justifiably appalled by 
the Caterpillar company's recent decision 
to close i t s Uddingston plant . The 
injury to the Scottish economy and to the 
plant ' s workforce has been compounded by 
the insu l t offered to the Secretary of 
State. In a matter of a few short weeks, 
a £62.5 m i l l i o n investment programme 
welcomed by Mr Rifkind in his Christmas 
message, including praise for the company 
and the workforce and s t r e s s on the 
importance of foreign investment for 
Scotland's f u t u r e , evaporated as the 
company decided to pull out of Scotland. 
The turnabout was made a l l the more 
inexplicable by evidence from unions and 
management that they considered the plant 
to be profitable and that they were buying 
in new machinery even after the closure 
had been announced. One Uddingston 
product - an upgraded medium-sized 
bulldozer - looked to have a successful 
future in a mainstream sector of earth 
moving equ ipment s a l e s . More 
importantly, the components which made up 
80% of the Uddingston plant 's production 
were a v i t a l input to C a t e r p i l l a r ' s 
internat ional operations in both Europe 
and the USA, par t icu lar ly in the context 
of Caterp i l la r ' s adoption of ' j u s t - i n -
time' techniques. A skilled, experienced 
and stable workforce was already on s i t e 
primed to carry out the upgrading of both 
t rac tor and components production. I t 
was even the case that new labour was 
being recruited by management on the basis 
of the plant's assured future. 
In place of t h i s bright future, we have 
seen one of the most protracted and public 
i n d u s t r i a l d i s p u t e s in contemporary 
S c o t t i s h i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s . A 
fourteen week occupation accompanied by 
p o l i t i c a l mach ina t ion , managerial 
i n t r a n s i g e n c e , c o n t r a d i c t o r y union 
pressures and workforce res i l ience has 
ended in the confusion of the MPAT Ltd 
ini t iat ive and the continuing probability 
of the plant's demise by early 1988. 
C a t e r p i l l a r ' s decision highl ights the 
contradiction at the heart of Scotland's 
commitment to indust r ia l growth on the 
back of foreign manufacturing investment. 
The contradiction has two dimensions. 
F i r s t l y , in order to a t t r a c t foreign 
capital, a complex benefits package must 
be offered to p o t e n t i a l i n v e s t o r s . 
Factors which might make Scotland less 
a t t r a c t i v e to the foreign investor, or 
which make o t h e r l o c a t i o n s more 
a t t r a c t i v e , must be negated. In 
par t icu la r , controls over the impact of 
such investment must be minimised in order 
t h a t i n v e s t o r s f e e l r e l a t i v e l y 
unconstrained. Yet that very freedom of 
action enhances the liberty of companies 
l ike Caterpi l lar to r e l o c a t e ou ts ide 
Scotland. Secondly, regional industrial 
policy has not concerned i t s e l f with the 
issue at the heart of the Caterpillar case 
- what do you do when decisions which do 
not re f lec t the indus t r ia l efficiency of 
the regional subsidiary lead to run-down 
or closure of that facility? How do you 
respond when what appears to most 
commentators to be a profi table plant i s 
closed on the basis of criteria which have 
l i t t l e or nothing to do with the plant 
i tself . 
Not al l cases are as stark as Caterpillar. 
Yet over the last decade Scotland has seen 
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subsidiary after subsidiary pared down or 
closed a t the behest of a foreign head 
o f f i c e . Goodyear, Singer , Massey 
Ferguson, Chrysler, NCR, Burroughs are but 
well-known examples of th i s phenomenon. 
Informed estimates put job losses at about 
25,000 as a consequence of such 
r e s t r u c t u r i n g . The i n d i g e n o u s 
manufacturing sector has of course also 
suffered a high r a t e of closures during 
t h i s period. The knock-on effect of 
closures on the Scottish economy points to 
even greater ind i rec t job loss and an 
accompanying d e s t a b i l i s a t i o n of the 
Scot t ish manufacturing base. I t i s now 
urgent tha t we reappraise the regional 
approach to foreign capital investment in 
order to balance the 'foreign investment 
a t (v i r tua l ly) any pr ice ' view with a 
longe r - t e rm a p p r a i s a l of Sco t l and ' s 
investment needs. Of course, such an 
a p p r a i s a l might then encompass the 
interests of a potential workforce as well 
as of the wider economy. 
L i t t l e of the above i s novel. Even the 
SDA and LIS may well agree privately with 
the thrus t of the argument, yet the i r 
public face appears to many of to be as 
seductive and compliant as ever in search 
of the next t ranche of inves tment . 
Government has nailed i t s colours to the 
same mast , a commitment mani fes t ly 
compromised by the Caterpi l lar debacle. 
Yet this of a l l governments i s unlikely to 
consider speci f ic c o n s t r a i n t s on the 
act ivi t ies of international investors. 
Integrative versus initiative strategies 
A feasible way forward would be to look to 
t h e E u r o p e a n Community f o r an 
in ternat ional response to the problem of 
mobile investment. Such a solution might 
simultaneously ensure that no competitor 
for i n v e s t m e n t would be u n f a i r l y 
obstructed in the i r sa les pitch, whils t 
the importance of the European market 
would mean tha t in ternat ional investors 
would be forced to operate to a standard 
European code of practice in order to gain 
access. However, t h i s solut ion, which 
might be dubbed the integrative approach, 
i s unlikely to be implemented. The 
establishment of a co-ordinated European 
model would require a degree of political 
co-operation far beyond current practice. 
As t h ings s tand , na t iona l economic 
policies might be compromised unacceptably 
by such a move. The b i t t e r progress of 
the r e l a t ive ly mild Vredeling proposals 
through the European system highlights the 
uncompromising opposition by national 
governments and enterpr ise managers to 
European-wide constraints on the firm. 
V r e d e l i n g sought to i n c r e a s e t he 
information flow about companies and their 
performance to the workforce, and permit 
g r e a t e r scu t iny of company decision-
making. i t was fought tooth and nai l 
throughout i t s p rogress through the 
European legislative framework and finally 
emerged a mere shadow of i t s former 
intention. 
The obstacles in the way of a successful 
implementation of an integrative approach 
suggest an alternative imitative posture. 
The imi ta t ive option emerges from the 
study of cases such as the Caterpi l lar 
closure. Take the establishment of a 
p l an t such as C a t e r p i l l a r ' s . I t i s 
located in Scotland because of a variety 
of factors, of which only one is the level 
of constraint on company activity imposed 
by the national government. For example, 
market locat ion, labour market factors , 
government a id , p o t e n t i a l for l o c a l 
production integration, local language and 
cul ture , and t r ad i t iona l l inks with the 
country, might a l l figure in the location 
decision. However, a t the moment of 
decision-making about relocat ion, the 
crucial conjunctural factor w i l l be the 
ease with which the movement of capacity 
may be undertaken. Comparisons between 
const ra in ts on movement in d i f f e r e n t 
production centres w i l l be made. The 
factors which brought about the location 
of the plant i n i t i a l l y may become ei ther 
irrelevant or relatively insignificant as 
headquarters decision-making responds to 
supra-national demands with supra-national 
pol ic ies . Hence the evidence from the 
Caterpillar case and others suggests that 
an impor tan t f ac to r - perhaps the 
important factor - in the decision to 
rationalise away from Uddingston was the 
r e l a t i v e c o s t s of c losu re in t h e i r 
Belgian, French and Scott ish locat ions. 
Put simply, i t i s much more time-consuming 
and costly to close plants in mainland 
Europe than i t i s in the UK. Supra-
national decisions might well hinge on 
such a factor. 
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Evidence which supports th i s focus on 
closure costs i s found in OECD studies 
which stress the impact of interventionist 
employment pol ic ies on closure decisions 
in mainland Europe. For example, in 
Germany legislation exists which requires 
a company to notify government agencies, 
works councils and unions about proposed 
dismissals of 10% or more of a workforce. 
The w o r k s ' c o u n c i l may demand 
comprehensive informat ion about the 
proposed rationalisation, and the employer 
i s r e q u i r e d to d i s c u s s whe the r 
redundancies can be avoided or how 
resul tant hardship may be reduced. The 
works' council can demand a social plan 
covering redundancy payments, the 
selection and timing of redundancies and a 
wide range of related matters. The 
s t a t e ' s regional employment office is 
empowered to defer dismissals for up to 
two months in order that retraining or the 
transfer of workers may be set in t ra in . 
Where work is rationalised, the employer 
i s responsible for a number of relatively 
cos t l y p rov i s ions r e l a t i n g to the 
maintenance of wage l e v e l s where 
downgrading occurs, the protection of 
workers of 55 or over, supplementary 
payments for short-time working and so on. 
In France, s imilar requirements exis t 
vis-a-vis notification of the intention to 
close plants and dismiss workers to both 
workers ' o r g a n i s a t i o n s and the local 
departmental labour office. However, in 
the final instance, government officials 
have the right to veto proposed dismissals 
by a company. Companies are required to 
fo l l ow a d e t a i l e d programme of 
c o n s u l t a t i o n which must e s t a b l i s h a 
legi t imate argument for redundancy or 
closure. 
In Italy, compulsory consultation with 
unions about proposed redundancies i s 
demanded in law. Unions have recourse to 
the courts which increasingly rule in 
terms of the social consequences of an 
employer 's a c t i on . In the highly 
pol i t ic i sed context of I t a l i an labour 
re la t ions , p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s and the 
relevant administrative authorities have 
intervened actively around the issue of 
proposed dismissals and thus may impose 
substant ia l pressure on an employer to 
avoid redundancy. Provisions such as the 
Earnings Supplement Fund provide economic 
support over extended periods of nine-
months or even more in order that short 
and medium-term economic pressures on a 
firm may be alleviated. 
Of course, the UK does have para l le l 
legislation. Firms must provide advance 
not i f ica t ion of proposed redundancies. 
The 1975 Employment Protection Act la id 
down a three month consultation period for 
proposed redundancies; minimum statutory 
redundancy payments are also la id down; 
time-off to search for another job i s 
legally guaranteed to a worker facing 
redundancy. These measures are supported 
by a number of o t h e r p r o v i s i o n s . 
However, the combined effect of the UK 
package is generally considered to be less 
onerous than many comparable packages 
elsewhere in Europe. The indust r ia l 
r e la t ions system seen by many to be a 
hallmark in the UK social fabric has 
n e i t h e r e s t a b l i s h e d the g e n e r a l 
consultation provisions embodied in works' 
council legislation, nor relied upon state 
executive intervention around employment 
r i g h t s , nor seen l ega l ac t ion as an 
e f f e c t i v e method of conducting the 
b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s . C o l l e c t i v e 
agreements have often been regarded as 
more than adequate frameworks in which 
employment legislation may operate. In 
the Caterpi l lar case, and many others in 
recent Scottish history, the UK framework 
has been w o e f u l l y i n e f f e c t i v e in 
restraining closure decisions. Employers 
have c o n s i s t e n t l y met t h e i r l ega l 
obl igat ions , yet such compliance rarely 
impinges upon the basic closure decision. 
Essentially, UK employment law comes into 
play after the strategic decision is made, 
acting more as a pa l l i a t i ve than as an 
effective defence of jobs or investment 
capacity. 
The policy implications for Scotland of 
the imi ta t ive approach emerge from a 
comparison of different employment law 
provisions across Europe. If the logic 
of a t t rac t ing foreign investors i s to 
create a s table sector of foreign-owned 
production, responsive to both i t s own and 
Scotland's needs, the open-door policy 
must be tempered with appropriate legal 
const ra in ts on the incomer's behaviour. 
Arguably, at the time of location a wider 
range of f a c t o r s inc luding any such 
constra ints as are deemed necessary will 
informal firm's decision. I t might be 
possible to countervail the effects of 
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such c o n s t r a i n t s i n t h e mind of t h e 
p o t e n t i a l i n v e s t o r w i t h added t a x , 
f i n a n c i a l , p r o p e r t y or d e v e l o p m e n t 
i n c e n t i v e s . The equ iva lence between 
S c o t t i s h r e q u i r e m e n t s and those found 
e l s ewhere might be s t ressed t o es tab l i sh 
t h e f a i r n e s s of the c o n s t r a i n t s . The 
u n w i l l i n g n e s s of a f i rm t o i n v e s t under 
such circumstances might sugges t t h a t in 
t h e l o n g run a s t a b l e m a n u f a c t u r i n g 
s t r a t e g y fo r Scot land could do w i thou t 
such an u n c o - o p e r a t i v e p a r t n e r . I t 
follows t ha t a l l companies - foreign-owned 
and UK-based - would be required t o adhere 
to the provisions. 
The c o n s t r a i n t s would come i n t o play 
p a r t i c u l a r l y when re loca t ion was planned. 
At t h a t t i m e , a w i l l i n g n e s s t o abide by 
agreed p r a c t i c e s would incur no p e n a l t y ; 
any u n w i l l i n g n e s s would be d e a l t wi th 
w i t h i n t h e f r amework of s a n c t i o n s 
e s t a b l i s h e d a t t h e t i m e of l o c a t i o n . 
Both s i d e s would play t o the r u l e s of the 
game in fo rce a t t h e moment of c a p i t a l 
loca t ion . 
What form should t h e s e cons t ra in t s take? 
P e r h a p s a meld of F r e n c h and German 
a p p r o a c h e s would be a u s e f u l b a s i c 
framework. I n t o a s u i t a b l y - a m e n d e d 
package of e x i s t i n g UK l e g i s l a t i o n could 
be inser ted the requirement to negotiate a 
s o c i a l p lan in t h e even t of a proposed 
redundancy. Local government agenc ies 
might be pe rmi t t ed the execu t ive a c t i o n 
accorded t o t h e i r e q u i v a l e n t s in France . 
For example, an employer might have t o 
e s t ab l i sh the legit imacy of h i s redundancy 
or c l o s u r e p o l i c y in t h e e y e s of an 
a p p r o p r i a t e g o v e r n m e n t agency . The 
framework governing a proposed c l o s u r e 
would therefore look something l i k e t h i s : 
Stage 2: f o r m a l n e g o t i a t i o n b e t w e e n 
company representa t ives and the 
workforce . I f an agreement 
w e r e t o be r e a c h e d a t t h i s 
s t a g e , i t would be r e p o r t e d t o 
the s t a t e agency for comment. 
Usual p rocedures r e l a t i n g t o 
redundancy payments e t c would 
then be s e t in t r a i n through the 
o p e r a t i o n of a s o c i a l p l a n 
including both company and s t a t e 
provision. 
Stage 3 : where no i n i t i a l agreement was 
reached, t h e company would be 
required t o stay i t s hand whi l s t 
a r b i t r a t i o n p rocedures a t t e m p t 
t o r e s o l v e the impasse . The 
designated s t a t e agency would be 
r e s p o n s i b l e for the a r b i t r a t i o n 
p r o c e s s , and , w h e r e such a 
c o m m i t m e n t w a s n o t y e t 
es tabl ished, the promotion of a 
s o c i a l plan. 
Stage 4: In the event t h a t no agreement 
i s reached dur ing Stage 3 , t he 
designated s t a t e agency would be 
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e 
commiss ion ing of a d e t a i l e d 
independent economic and social 
survey of t h e c l o s u r e proposa l 
a n d i t s e f f e c t s . An 
appropriate period of t ime would 
be al located for the preparation 
of the survey. The d e c i s i o n s 
a v a i l a b l e t o the agency would 
be: c l o s u r e on the b a s i s of an 
exis t ing or amended socia l plan; 
a recommendation tha t the plant 
should con t inue in p roduc t ion , 
wi th a d e t a i l e d j u s t i f i c a t i o n . 
Of major impor tance a t t h i s 
s t a g e i s t h e p r o v i s i o n t h a t the 
firm should not be permitted t o 
r e l o c a t e t h e a f f ec t ed p l a n t ' s 
machinery u n t i l the agency 's 
decisions are enacted. 
Stage 1: company p r o p o s a l s would be 
p r e s e n t e d t o employees, unions 
and the designated s t a t e agency. 
A formally-establ ished six month 
pe r iod of c o n s u l t a t i o n would 
commence. The i n f o r m a t i o n 
necessa ry in o rder t o make an 
informed judgement about the 
s t a t e of the company would be 
made ava i lab le . 
These p r o p o s a l s r a i s e a v a r i e t y of 
q u e s t i o n s , only some of which can be 
t a c k l e d h e r e . Agencies such as the SDA 
and LIS would have t o p r o v i d e an 
a p p r o p r i a t e i n f r a s t r u c t u r e i n which 
adherence t o the procedures would be 
fostered. In the i n i t i a l bargaining with 
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a potential investor, the framework would 
be explained as a general requirement 
imposed on a l l firms intending to make an 
investment. The package would appear as 
only one factor in a range of issues under 
discussion and might be presented as, for 
example, are French and German regulations 
- as an unquestioned aspect of local 
labour relations pract ices . Government 
would have to create and support the 
designated s t a t e agency. Unions would 
have to amend the i r bargaining practices 
to encompass the social plan aspect of the 
model. They might also have to rethink 
the scope of the bargaining process and 
the union approach to i t s conduct. 
obviously, the general provision would be 
a minimum requirement; some employers and 
workforces might agree to a more 
extensive framework. 
The key question about the operation of 
this procedure relates to the ability of a 
government to impose the second decision 
in Stage 4 on an internat ional investor. 
In pract ice , as in Germany and France, 
agreements generally do emerge duing the 
consultation period and i t may be that the 
second option would be rarely i f ever 
needed. The proposal has been posed 
above in terms of a 'recommendation' 
rather than a directive simply because i t 
i s conceivable that, where agreements were 
not reached, a firm might simply leave the 
th rea tened p l a n t and the UK, thus 
absent ing i t s e l f from the competent 
national legal framework. However, the 
exper ience of France suggests t h a t 
in ternat ional firms may be unwilling to 
act so precipately simply because of 
market or l e g a l sanc t ions which a 
government may impose aga ins t o ther 
subsidiaries within national boundaries, 
or aga in s t the company's products . 
However, as the aim of the proposal i s to 
work with the company rather than against 
i t , and to promote a responsible framework 
in which competing interests are catered 
for, the emphasis would be on Stages 1 to 
3 rather than on the extremes envisaged in 
Stage 4. 
Although the introduction of such measures 
would require substantial p o l i t i c a l wi l l 
on the part of the government of the day, 
the task i s not technically d i f f i cu l t . 
Equally, the legislation would not call on 
large resources in i t s implementation. 
I t might even prove to be po l i t i ca l ly 
popular! 
These are r e a l i s t i c proposals, although 
they run counter to government, regional 
p o l i c y and e n t e r p r i s e v iews of 
internat ional location strategy. They 
may be challenged on the grounds that they 
obstruct the operation of the market, or 
they reduce the flexibility of the labour 
m a r k e t , or t h a t they i n t e r j e c t 
unacceptable p o l i t i c a l c r i t e r i a i n to 
dec i s ions to l o c a t e . Perhaps the 
strongest criticism will be that they may 
d e f l e c t p o t e n t i a l investors from the 
S c o t t i s h economy. There may be an 
element of t r u t h in a l l of these 
c r i t i c i sms , but the a l te rna t ive i s to 
accept the responsibility of a relatively-
unconstrained haemorrhage of investment 
production and employment from Scotland. 
What cannot be denied i s that un t i l an 
effective code of practice is introduced, 
the arbi t rary closure of plants such as 
Caterp i l la r ' s w i l l continue unchecked. 
Given tha t we are now in mid-election 
campaign, i t w i l l be in teres t ing to note 
the ex t en t to which the C a t e r p i l l a r 
occupation has put these issues on to the 
Scottish political agenda. 
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